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RHETORIC VERSUS REALITY IN SENTENCING VIOLENT 
OOMESTIC OFFENDERS IN WA: H (1995) 81 A Cri m R 88 * 
By Karen Whitney• 
Introduction 
In June 1994, Western Australian Chief Justice David Malcolm's 
Taskforce on Gender Bias reported that: 
All domestic violence must be stopped and the criminal 
justice system is the first place that can affirm and enfor9.e 
societal condemnation of violence against womenO. 
[D]omestic violence is a crime and must be consistently 
treated as such by the criminal justice system; it is not a 
social rroblem to be 
, 
managed
' 
by welfare agencies. 
Judicia response to domestic violence has traditionally 
left women victims without sufficient protection or 
remedy. The court system, as the police system, tends to 
view domestic violence as a family /private problem.1 
Within one year of these criticisms of judicial response to domestic 
violence, Chief Justice Malcolm had the opportunity to meet the 
challenge raised by his Taskforce. In H,2 the Chief Justice had the chance 
to demonstrate that he fully appreciated the criminal nature of domestic 
violence, and that he was willing to sentence accordingly. 
Unfortunately, the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy failed to meet this 
challenge on behalf of the Court. To the contrary, their Honours 
demonstrated that they continue to view domestic violence as a marital 
and/or social problem, and that they are reluctant to deal seriously 
. 
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with violent domestic offenders. This view does not conform with their 
rhetoric that domestic violence 'will not be tolerated? 
In this article, I critically review the decisions of the Chief Justice and 
Justice Kennedy in H. I argue that despite their rhetoric, their use of the 
'welfare approach' test and their application of it to the facts in H 
demonstrates that they view domestic violence as less serious than non­
domestic violence. To support this position, I argue first that use of the 
'welfare approach' is inappropriate in the context of sentencing 
domestic offenders because it rewards an offender for exercising 
economic, social and/ or emotional control over the victim. Second, I 
argue that the Chief Justice's application of the welfare approach test in 
H demonstrates an inability to fully comprehend the gravity of the 
criminal conduct, and to consider the need for general deterrence raised 
by the assault. I conclude that despite its rhetoric, the reality is that the 
Court continues to view domestic violence as a private family problem. 
The Facts 
The assault committed by Mr H upon his wife was extremely brutal. On 
22 May 1994, Mr and Mrs H attended a work function at a restaurant, 
which later continued at an hotel. Both Mr and Mrs H consumed 
alcohol in the course of the evening, and by midnight both were 'clearly 
affected' by alcohol.4 
In the car on the way home from the function, Mr H commenced the 
assault on his wife. He grabbed Mrs H by the hair, pulled her towards 
the floor of the vehicle, and ordered her to unzip his boots. She was 
3 ld, 104. 
4 ld, 89. 
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unable to  do so and began to cry. Upon arrival at  their home, Mr H 
punched Mrs H in the face and in the side of the head several times, and 
kicked her on the living room floor. By this time Mrs H was bleeding 
from the nose. The assault was witnessed by a friend of Mrs H (the 
friend'] who was at the time in the H home minding the H children as 
well as her own. Two of the children witnessed this aspect of the 
assault upon Mrs H.5 
The friend did not call the police in relation to the assault because Mr H 
threatened to kill Mrs H if she did so. The friend was also concerned 
that Mr H would harm her children as well as the H children if she 
summoned assistance. Further, at some point during the attack, Mr H 
pulled the telephone out of the wall. Accordingly, the assault continued. 
Mr H grabbed Mrs H by the hair and dragged her into the bedroom, 
where he attempted to force his penis into her mouth. When Mrs H 
fought to escape, Mr H punched her several times in the head. He finally 
succeeded in achieving penetration of her mouth with his penis (count 
Mrs H began vomiting blood. Mr H responded by stating, 
'
All right, 
I I 
bitch, I 11 root you up the arse , and penetrated Mrs H in the anus with 
his penis (count 2). Mrs H, still bleeding from the nose, continued to 
struggle and call for help during the attack. Mr H then got a wet towel 
and placed it on Mrs H' s face. Mr H again demanded that Mrs H suck 
his penis, and again attempted to penetrate her mouth (count 3). Mrs H 
5Ibid. 
6 Id, 89-90. 
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pulled away, and Mr H proceeded to masturbate, ejaculating on Mrs H' s 
face and hair. Mr H let his wife go, and fell asleep on the bed. 7 
Mr H was arrested and charged with three counts of aggravated sexual 
penetration, to which he pleaded guilty. Within several days of his 
arrest, Mrs H attempted to have the criminal proceedings against her 
husband discontinued. Mrs H had forgiven Mr H for the assault, they 
had reconciled, and shortly thereafter she became pregnant.8 When her 
attempts to have the charges withdrawn failed, she wrote to the Crown 
asking for leniency in sentencing her husband. She stated in her letter to 
the Crown that: 
I am just hoping the charges can still be dropped through 
this letter this is my last h<:lpe [sic]. I do love my husband 
and by some miracle which I thought could never happen, 
we are closer now that [sic] we have ever been. It might 
hurt him to go to jail, but the person most affected would 'be 
me, as r' m pregnant without any family here whatsoever 
and can
'
t really see myself coping financially or 
emotionally. { m scared.9 
Mrs H also gave evidence at the sentencing hearing to the effect that she 
had reconciled with Mr H and it would be a financial and personal 
hardship for her if her husband were to go to prison. 10 
The sentencing judge commented that: 
If it were not his wife, I have no doubt that a very 
substantial term of imprisonment would be justified. I 
would have thought something in the order of seven to 
eight years woUld be the appropriate sentence for 
offences of this description, were it not his wife - and that 
might be putting it on the low side but by way of a 
7 ld, 90. 
SId. 95-97. 
9 ld, 91. 
lO Id, 92-93. 
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moderate sentence. Now the fact that it is his wife who is 
being treated in this, I would have thought, disgusting and 
vicious manner - does that mean that the community 
interest justifies the imposition of a non- custodial term? 
.. . In my opinion, your conduct on the night in question 
was so grave that it calls for condign punishrrient not 
only in the hope that it will deter you but also others in 
the community who act in such an abhorrent manner to 
women generally and wives in particular. These types of 
offences are far too prevalent in the community ana will 
inevitably lead to substantial custodial terms .... Because 
of the special circumstances in this case including the 
treaties L sic] of your wife and her wish to have the family 
unit reconstructed as quickly as possible, I intend to 
impose a much more lenient sentence that would 
otherwise be appropriate.11 
The sentencing judge then sentenced Mr H to three years imprisonment. 
Mr H appealed from that sentence to the Court of Criminal Appeal. His 
grounds of appeal were that the sentencing judge failed to have sufficient 
regard for the wishes of the victim of the offence (ground 1) and the 
manner in which the charges came before the court (ground 2). 12 
Reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeal 
In a 2-1 decision, the Court of Criminal Appeal allowed Mr H' s appeal 
and substituted a probation order for the sentence of imprisonment. The 
Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy agreed that the case fell 
'
within the 
exceptional circumstances in which a non-custodial disposition was 
justified.
'
13 Justice Murray dissented. 
The Chief Justice identified the 
'
dilemma
' 
of this case: 
On the one hand, the community recognises that domestic 
violence is a significant problem and that where it has 
been perpetrated it constitutes a criminal offence which 
shoula be dealt with accordingly. It needs to be 
demonstrated that the courts are prepared to ensure that 
11ld, 94-95 (emphasis added). 
12 ld, 95. 
13 ld, 104. 
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victims of domestic violence are protected and that, where 
appropriate, sentences are imposed which will mark the 
community
'
s disapproval of domestic violence and will 
serve the ends of oath personal and general deterrence. At 
the same time, the courts have been repeatedly asked to 
take full account of the position of ilie victims of such 
offences in the sentencing process. In addition, it has been 
recognised that full regard should be paid to the prospects 
of rehabilitation and the maintenance of the family unit 
where that is possible. This has sometimes been called a 
'welfare approach'. 14 
The Chief Justice then went on to discuss a series of cases involving 
violence within the family unit where this 'welfare approach
' 
was 
considered.15 The test that he adopted from these cases was whether the 
gravity of the criminal conduct concerned and the need for personal and 
general deterrence outweighed the desires and wishes of the 
complainant and the future prospects of not only reconciliation, and 
maintaining the continuity of the family unit, but also the rehabilitation 
of the offender.16 
The Chief Justice then purported to apply this test to the facts of the H 
case. He assessed the gravity of the offence as light, because Mrs H had 
'forgiven
' 
Mr H for the attack. He assessed the need for personal 
deterrence as low, because Mr H had committed himself to abstain from 
alcohol, and had succeeded in doing so in the nine months between the 
attacks and sentencing. However, despite articulating it as a component 
of the test, the Chief Justice then failed to assess the need for general 
deterrence as a factor in weighing this arm of the equationP 
14 ld, 9R. 
15Id, 99, citing Boyd [1984] WAR 236; Vcm Roosmalen (1989) 43 A Crim R 358; Johnson, Court of Criminal 
Appeal, unreported, 5 March 1992, SCLN 920110; Spence, Court of Criminal Appeal, unreported, 22 
December 1992, SCLN 920697; Terranova, Court of Criminal Appeal, unreported, 26 October 1993, SCLN 930576; Keding, Court of Criminal Appeal, unreported, 22 September 1994 SCLN 940522; Wilson, Court of 
Criminal Appeal, unreported, 26 May 1995, SCLN 950258. Note, however, that of these seven cases cited by 
the Chief Justice, six held that after weighing these factors, a sentence of imprisonment was appropriate (Van 
Rnosmalcn, the Victorian case, was the only exception.) 
16 H (1995) 81 A Crim R 88, 103-104 
17 Ibid. 
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On the other side of the equation, the Chief Justice assessed as severe the 
impact that Mr H
' 
s imprisonment would have on Mrs H and the H 
family. On balance, the Chief Justice concluded that the case fell witl)in 
the 'exceptional circumstances in which a non-custodial disposition 
was justified.
'18 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy emphasised the need to ensure 
that the victim in circumstances such as these was entirely genuine, and 
not influenced to any extent by the assailant. He further noted that in 
his view it was appropriate for the courts to take into account the 
probable effects that a custodial sentence would have on the offender
'
s 
family. 
Justice Murray dissented, indicating that he would dismiss the appeal. 
He characterised the issue as whether hardship on the part of victim or 
someone other than the offender should have any impact upon the 
sentencing process. 19 He emphasised that in this case, the sentencing 
judge had not overlooked this issue. To the contrary, the sentencing 
judge had considered the impact on the H family, and reduced the length 
of Mr H
'
s imprisonment from what would have ordinarily been 7-8 
years down to 3 years. 20 
Justice Murray considered a number of decisions in which the court had 
been asked to consider the impact of the sentencing process on innocent 
persons. He concluded that it would be an extremely rare case where 
such factors would be considered.21 As examples, he cited cases stating 
lS Ibid. 
19Jd, 106. 
20 Ibid. 
21Id. 107. 
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that it should be done only where it would be 
'
inhumane to refuse to do 
so,'22or where it' will result in children being left to fend for themselves 
as best they can without parental supervision or support
'
.23 
Justice Murray reasoned that in his view, the question to be resolved 
was whether the sentencing judge erred, not in overlooking the elements 
of hardship placed before him, but rather in reducing the sentence of 
imprisonment as opposed to ·imposing a non-custodial sentence. He 
maintained that such a proposition was not made out in this case. There 
was no evidence that Mrs H could not cope in the absence of her 
husband. The only evidence of hardship was financial, and although 
there was no doubt that the family would struggle, 'that does not make 
the case sufficiently exceptional to require this Court to conclude that 
the exercise of sentencing discretion has miscarried.'24 
Critique 
Justice Kennedy opened his concurring opinion in H with the following 
statement: 
This Court has stressed time and again that the fact that 
an offence is committed in a domestic setting does not make 
the offence one of purely domestic or private concern. It is  
necessary that the courts should demonstrate very clearly 
that domestic violence, which is now recognised as an 
extremely serious social problem, will not be tolerated.25 
Despite these sentiments, the Chief Justice's and Justice Kennedy
'
s use of 
the 'welfare approach' test and their application of it to the facts in H 
22Id, 109 (citing Wirth (1976) 14 SASR 291) 
23 H (1995) op, cit. at 88, 109 (citing Boyle (1987) 34 A Crim R 202). 
24 H (1995) op. cit. 88, Ill. 
25 ld, 104 (emphasis added). Note !hal even while purporting to emphasise the seriousness of domestic 
violence, Justice Kennedy undermines his statement by referring to domestic violence as a social problem 
rather than a criminal one, 
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demonstrates that they consider domestic violence to be less serious than 
non-domestic violence. In this section, I support this position by arguing 
that use of the 'welfare approach' is inappropriate in the context of 
sentencing domestic offenders because it rewards an offender for 
exercising economic, social and/ or emotional control over the victim. 
Second, I argue that the Chief Justice's (incomplete) application of the 
welfare approach test in H demonstrates an inability to appreciate the 
gravity of the criminal conduct, and a failure to assess the need for 
general deterrence raised by the assault. I conclude that despite its 
rhetoric, the reality is that the Court continues to view domestic 
violence as a private family problem. 
I I 
Welfare approach 
The welfare approach adopted by the Chief Justice in H is a balancing 
test. On the one hand, the court must assess the gravity of the criminal 
conduct and the need for personal and general deterrence. On the other 
hand, the court must consider the desires and wishes of the complainant, 
the future prospects of reconciliation, maintenance of the family unit, 
and rehabilitation of the offender. 
Although the welfare approach may be appropriate in some sentencing 
contexts, it is inappropriate in matters involving violence within the 
family. To apply the welfare approach in matters of domestic violence 
risks rewarding the offender for his exercise of economic, social, and 
emotional control over the victim (which itself constitutes domestic 
violence). 
There is no dispute that in H, the victim herself pleaded for leniency in 
sentencing the offender. However, because of her social, emotional and 
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economic dependence on her assailant, she had little choice. The victim 
was a 23 year old woman with no local family trying to raise three 
small children. Her husband had subjected her to violent assaults in the 
past.26 She was convinced that her family could not survive without her 
husband. Significantly, she was afraid of poverty for herself and her 
children. Given her options, she chose to accept the possible risk of 
further physical violence rather than the undoubted reality of economic 
deprivation. 
In her letter to the Crown she emphasised this fear: 
'
[I] can
'
t really see 
myself coping financially or emotionally. I
'
m scared
'
. She also admitted 
'
I am the one taking the risks
'
. 27 She discounted her husband
'
s 
accountability for the assault, shifting responsibility to herself. 'I feel 
my husband is not a threat to society[,] it is the first time he has 
assaulted anybody and it was me.
'
28 When asked how she knew Mr H 
would not be violent to her again, Mrs H replied, 'Well if I see him pick 
up a beer I will be out of there .I
'
m not taking the chance with rre getting 
hurt or anything like that.
'
29 Given her clearly expressed inability to 
cope without her husband, and her tolerance of his violence and alcohol 
abuse in the past, her statement that she would leave him if  he resumed 
drinking and abuse rings hollow. 
Although it may appease a victim in the short term, the welfare approach 
does nothing to protect her from similar abuse in the future. To the 
contrary, it may serve to perpetuate the cycle of violence. It creates an 
26 Id, 9S. 
27 ld 91 
28 Ib;d (;cad: his assaulting me is not sufficient to constitute a threat to society, as I am not important 
enough to matter). 
29 ld, 93. 
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incentive for an offender to keep the victim in a state of  emotional, social 
and/ or economic dependence. 
Justice Kennedy's concerns expressed in his concurring opinion that 
such requests by the victim must be 
'
entirely genuine
' 
only serves to 
demonstrate his failure to appreciate that although the request may be 
'
genuine
'
, it still may be. the product of a destroyed self-esteem, or 
economic dependence and fear. 
Application of the welfare approach in H 
As discussed above, the welfare approach adopted by the Chief Justice 
in H is a balancing test. It weighs the gravity of the criminal conduct 
and the need for personal and general deterrence against the desires and 
wishes of the complainant, the future prospects of reconciliation, 
maintenance of the family unit, and rehabilitation of the offender. The 
Chief Justice purported to apply this test to the facts in H. However, his 
application of the test demonstrates an inability to appreciate the 
gravity of Mr H
' 
s criminal conduct. It also demonstrates indifference to 
the need for general deterrence of violent assaults in the home. In his 
eagerness to bring this case within the 
'
exceptional circumstances in 
which a non-custodial disposition was justified
'
,3° the Chief Justice was 
forced to strain to find legal support for his decision. 
The Chief Justice
'
s decision would �to contain ample evidence that 
he did not appreciate the gravity of the horrific offences committed 
against Mrs H, and that he was influenced by the domestic nature of the 
attack. In assessing the gravity of the offence, he emphasised that Mrs H 
30 ld, 104 
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had 'forgiven
' 
Mr H for the attack. He stated that 
'
the immediate 
consequences and impact of [the offences] upon [Mrs H] was apparently 
not great. It seems that [Mrs H] made a quick recovery from her injuries. 
Within four days she had accepted his apology and forgiven him. The 
two of them had resolved to solve the problem.'31 He implied that the 
assault by Mr H on Mrs H was a marital problem that could be resolved 
by mutual cooperation and effort, rather than a violent, degrading, and 
brutal criminal act against Mrs H. He did not ·address the fact that if 
these acts were committed by a stranger, whether the victim had 
'fo�given
' 
the offender would be irrelevant to prosecution and 
sentencing. 
The Chief Justice
'
s failure to appreciate the gravity of the attack by M r  
H i s  further reflected in his interpretation o f  the cases he relied on as 
support for adopting the 
'
welfare approach
'
. All but one of the cases 
cited by the Chief Justice ultimately concluded that the gravity of the 
offence outweighed the harm to the victim and family, and a custodial 
sentence was warranted.32 This emphasises the truly exceptional nature 
of the welfare approach. The fact that the Chief Justice found the attack 
by Mr H to be less grave than those described in the 
'
welfare
' 
cases 
demonstrates a fundamental failure to appreciate the seriousness of the 
violence to which Mrs H was subjected. 
The decision of the Chief Justice suggests indifference to the need for 
general deterrence of domestic violence.33 Despite including the need for 
3l Id, 104 (emphasis added). 
32 Id, 99, citing Boyd [1984] WAR 236; Van Roomoale11 (1989) 43 A Crim R 358; Johnson, Court of Criminal 
Appeal, unreported, 5 March 1992, SCLN 920110; Spence, Court of Criminal Appeal, unreported, 22 
December 1992, SCLN 920697; Terranova, Court of Criminal Appeal, unreported, 26 October 1993, SCLN 
930576; Keding, Court of Criminal Appeal, unreported, 22 September 1994 SCLN 940522; Wilson, Court of 
Criminal Appeal, unreported, 26 May 1995, SCLN 950258. 
33 Other courts have taken the view that it is appropriate to promote general deterrence by sending a message 
to men that domestic violence will not be tolerated, For example, in In re Marsh (1993) 17 Family Law 
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general deterrence a s  a factor to be weighed in the welfare approach 
test, he did not factor its weight when assessing the need for a custodial 
sentence in H. This breach, whether intended or inadvertent, reduced 
the overall weight of the first arm of the balancing test, and reduced the 
likelihood that a custodial sentence would be imposed. 
On the other hand, the Chief !ustice considered that the impact of Mr H
' 
s 
imprisonment on Mrs H and the H family would be severe. He 
emphasised that without Mr H' s financial support, Mrs H would be a 
woman with three young children forced to survive on the Supporting 
Parent
's Pension from the Department of Social Services. He also 
ranked highly the fact that if Mr H did not go to jail, the family unit 
would be maintained. The Chief Justice, on the balance, concluded that 
the case fell within the 'exceptional circumstances in which a non­
custodial disposition was justified.'34 
The Chief Justice attempted to rationalise his decision by suggesting that 
he was merely responding to repeated demands that courts take full 
account of the position of victims during the sentencing process.35 
However, the primary goal of the world-wide movement for greater 
recognition of victims
' 
rights is to provide victims with a role in the 
criminal process. It is to give victims the right to have the full effects of 
the crime against them made known to the sentencing court.36 It is to give 
the court opportunity to appreciate, n!Jt depreciate, the gravity of the 
offence. Any suggestion that the welfare approach to sentencing violent 
Reports 289, the Court awarded the victim exemplary damages specifically for this purpose. 
34 H (1995) op. cit. 88, 104. 
35 ld, 98. 
36 See Charter of Victim's RiRht.v (WA) 1991; Victimr of Crime.v Act (WA) 1994 
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domestic offenders responds to the call for victims' rights trivialises the 
goals of the movement. 
Conclusion 
As remarked by Justice Murray in the dissent, 'there is scarcely a case 
that comes before this Court, when a person is sentenced to 
imprisonment, in which it cannot be said that there is a great distress 
and hardship caused to the members of the family
'
.37 Where the 
offender
'
s family and the victim
'
s family are the same, it is tempting to 
use the welfare approach to impose a non-custodial sentence to alleviate 
further suffering on the part of those innocent family. However, this 
temptation should be avoided in sentencing violent domestic offenders. 
As stated by Justice Murray, the court
'
s responsibility is not only to the 
victim, but also to the public at large. 
For my part, I consider that it is important to bear firmly in mind that a 
sentencing court has a public duty to perform and must not shirk its task 
which is primarily to arrive at a sentence proportionate to the gravity 
of the offence, having regard to the circumstances of its commission, and 
having regard to the personal circumstances of the offender and 
available mitigation. It will by that means inject into the sentencing 
process an appropriate degree of certainty and consistency, rather than 
severity, which is best calculated to achieve the protection of the 
community.38 
The decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in H sets dangerous 
precedent in Western Australia. It opens the door for the courts to 
37 H (1995) op cit. 88, 108 (citing Amuso (1987) 32 A Crim R 308 at 313). 
38 H (1995) op. cit. 88, 110 (emphasis added). 
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impose non-custodial sentences on domestic offenders in positions of  
emotional, social, and economic power in the family, merely by reason of 
that power. It demonstrates the capacity of the two most senior jurists 
in Western Australia to overlook brutal violence against women merely 
because that violence occurs in the home. More importantly, however, it 
confirms what victims of domestic violence have always suspected: that 
despite their rhetoric to the contrary, the courts do not equate domestic 
violence with other forms of violence. Until the courts are willing to 
recognise that domestic violence is 'real
' 
violence, they will continue to 
promote a culture of violence in the home at the expense of Australian 
women. 
